Create-A-Thon

Species: Majin
Age: Umm how old is Buu is suppose to be?
Gender: Male/ Female

Now I have the second DB species signed up.

Species: Anthropomorphic Fox
Age: 20's
Gender: Male


Species: Star Warriors
Age: Poyo
Gender: Poyo

Species: Rabbids
Age: Bwaa
Gender: Indeterminate (would you classify Rabbid Peach/ Rabbid Valkirys as female or just a gender neutral rabbits)


Species: Boos
Age: They are dead so ageless
Gender: Male/ Female

Don't get it??

Species: Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird
Age: 52
Gender: reconnaissance aircraft

Species: Elf
Age: 241 (years)
Gender: F


Species: Fly
Age: 7 (hours)
Gender: M

Species: Slime
Age: A bit crusty
Gender: Blue

Species: WereSquid
Age: 19
Gender: M

Appearance: Like a Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird except painted an obnoxiously bright orange.
Backstory: retirement

The SR-71 program was terminated due to Pentagon politics, and not because the aircraft had become obsolete or irrelevant, or suffered maintenance problems, or had unsustainable program costs, although these reasons are frequently cited as justifications for its downfall. In the 1970s and early 1980s, SR-71 squadron and wing commanders were often promoted into higher positions as general officers within the Air Force structure and the Pentagon. (In order to be selected into the SR-71 program in the first place, a pilot or navigator (RSO) had to be a top-quality Air Force officer, so continuing career progression for members of this elite group was not surprising.) These generals were adept at communicating the value of the SR-71 to an Air Force command staff and a Congress who often lacked a basic understanding of how the SR-71 worked and what it did. However, by the mid-1980s, these SR-71 generals all had retired, and a new generation of Air Force generals wanted to cut the program's budget and spend its funding on new strategic bomber programs instead, especially the very expensive B-2 Spirit.

The Air Force saw the SR-71 as a bargaining chip which could be sacrificed to ensure the survival of other priorities. Also, the SR-71 program's "product", which was operational and strategic intelligence, was not seen by these generals as being very valuable to the Air Force. The primary consumers of this intelligence were the CIA, NSA, and DIA. A former 1st SRS commander believed that if the SR-71 had been funded by an intelligence agency (like the A-12 was), instead of the Air Force, it would have easily survived. A general misunderstanding of the nature of aerial reconnaissance and a lack of knowledge about the SR-71 in particular (due to its secretive development and operations) was used by detractors to discredit the aircraft, with the assurance given that a replacement was under development. Dick Cheney told the Senate Appropriations Committee that the SR-71 cost $85,000 per hour to operate. Opponents estimated the aircraft's support cost at $400 to $700 million per year, though the cost was actually closer to $300 million.

The SR-71, while much more capable than the Lockheed U-2 in terms of range, speed, and survivability, suffered the lack of a data link, which the U-2 had been upgraded to carry. This meant that much of the SR-71's imagery and radar data could not be used in real time, but had to wait until the aircraft returned to base. This lack of immediate real-time capability was used as one of the justifications to close down the program. Attempts to add a datalink to the SR-71 were stymied early on by the same factions in the Pentagon and Congress who were already set on the program's demise, even in the early 1980s. These same factions also forced expensive sensor upgrades to the SR-71, which did little to increase its mission capabilities, but could be used as justification for complaining about the cost of the program.

In 1988, Congress was convinced to allocate $160,000 to keep six SR-71s and a trainer model in flyable storage that could become flightworthy within 60 days. However, the USAF refused to spend the money. While the SR-71 survived attempts to retire it in 1988, partly due to the unmatched ability to provide high-quality coverage of the Kola Peninsula for the US Navy, the decision to retire the SR-71 from active duty came in 1989, with the last missions flown in October that year. Four months after the plane's retirement, General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., was told that the expedited reconnaissance, which the SR-71 could have provided, was unavailable during Operation Desert Storm.

The SR-71 program's main operational capabilities came to a close at the end of fiscal year 1989 (October 1989). The 1st SRS kept its pilots and aircraft operational and active, and flew some operational reconnaissance missions through the end of 1989 and into 1990, due to uncertainty over the timing of the final termination of funding for the program. The squadron finally closed in mid-1990, and the aircraft were distributed to static display locations, with a number kept in reserve storage.